wxmang 发表于 2012-2-17 11:04 static/image/common/back.gif
条约就如结婚证，对双方都是约束，所以一个正在长身体的妙龄少女，是不想彻底吊在一棵歪脖子树上的，还有 ...
幸亏毛主席给我们留下了原子弹。
不然就真的是少女了，哈哈
豆子星 发表于 2012-2-18 18:37 static/image/common/back.gif
说句打嘴的话，要是房价下跌，老百姓第一个不干啊
北京房价高，真的是北方需求硬挺。
以我的切 ...
年轻的老百姓们估计会很不同意您的看法～{:2_35:}
wxmang 发表于 2012-2-18 12:55 static/image/common/back.gif
我想一个是敲山震虎，哪些吃不住劲的自己先跑，减少后来的处理难度，对钉子户，坐地炮，最终大赦，下不为 ...
小产权房我们那里很多，要是真处理估计很有难度
秦风 发表于 2012-2-18 23:31 static/image/common/back.gif
小产权房我们那里很多，要是真处理估计很有难度
实际上这就是一个新的既成事实的定向募集公司案例，以后处理也类似，不会太出格，毕竟众怒难犯。
wxmang 发表于 2012-2-19 10:46 static/image/common/back.gif
实际上这就是一个新的既成事实的定向募集公司案例，以后处理也类似，不会太出格，毕竟众怒难犯。
北京一些小产权楼盘，如果没有大量出售，可能会被政府回购，作为保障房使用。
yt991593 发表于 2012-2-19 11:01 static/image/common/back.gif
北京一些小产权楼盘，如果没有大量出售，可能会被政府回购，作为保障房使用。
三亚正在做这个实验。
wxmang 发表于 2012-2-19 11:10 static/image/common/back.gif
三亚正在做这个实验。
提供一个案例，昌平区沙河镇白各庄，去年村委会和开发商合伙盖了一片小产权房，五证全无。今年，区政府的保障房任务完成无望，就按1万每平回购这片小产权。村委会的条件是，区政府须把村里另一处小产权房给转正。结果是皆大欢喜！
wxmang 发表于 2012-2-18 18:30 static/image/common/back.gif
实际工作环境比书上的理想环境差别很大，甚至完全不同，书本上好的做法，在实际中往往是胡说八道。有很多 ...
我觉得这就是模型问题，书本永远不可能模拟出跟现实同构的模型。所以书本上的答案是根据简化条件后得出的结果。毛主席的实践论讲的就是这个问题，是大白菜版的知行合一论，我想王阳明看到实践论得汗颜{:4_238:}
武当七瞎 发表于 2012-2-18 21:31 static/image/common/back.gif
呵呵，看来兄台是有米的人，机场沿线可是富人聚居区，几台悍马算得了什么？
现在对房价敏感的主 ...
我也不是富人，只是恰巧了解一些居住小区的情况而已。
我在帝都也买不起房子，当时有点闲钱时在家乡买的蜗居而已。
85后今年最大的也就是27岁，工作6年最多，买房还是有难度的，大部分都是啃老吧。
wxmang 发表于 2012-2-19 10:46 static/image/common/back.gif
实际上这就是一个新的既成事实的定向募集公司案例，以后处理也类似，不会太出格，毕竟众怒难犯。
老家是山东一个县城，城乡总共才77万人口。近年来提出要建设成50万人口的鲁中中等城市，城区扩大好多倍，到处大兴土木。好几个乡镇变成街道办事处，开始并村搞社区，盖楼给农民住。但是好几个地方都是要农民集资，建完了有优先购买权，很多不是这些农村集体组织的人也准备买这种房子。中央治理小产权房，这些也该算在内吧。总感觉这种模式早晚会出问题~~
豆子星 发表于 2012-2-18 18:37 static/image/common/back.gif
说句打嘴的话，要是房价下跌，老百姓第一个不干啊
北京房价高，真的是北方需求硬挺。
以我的切 ...
老百姓被你一个给代表了， 北京房价高，全民都想炒房赚钱，需求确实硬。
北京家家都有两套住房么？ 这个让 没房的北京土著知道，确实如你所说打您嘴哦。
房价大涨的时段，很多想买房土著蜗居在里弄里面，没房的漂流族等等，我没看到阁下说几句话么。
总算没掉队找到队伍了 又来听忙总课
小丘 发表于 2012-2-18 22:51 static/image/common/back.gif
年轻的老百姓们估计会很不同意您的看法～
茶馆互相交流信息，我就是描述我知道的情况而已。
大城市其实竞争很残酷，外地青年与土著存在极大不公平的竞争，这是客观存在的事情。
比如北京上海的拆迁，早年给钱少，但是给房多，现今给钱多，给房少一点，但是仍然相对工资是天数。如果房价跌，意味着拆迁补偿的减少，那么肯定是&……%&#￥@#@￥……￥，省去100字。
忙总能给解惑一下这个报道的内涵吗?
据伊朗《德黑兰时报》2月18日报道，伊朗国家石油公司（NIOC）和中国国际石油化工联合有限责任公司（UNIPEC）已经达成协议，将对华石油出口提高至每日50万桶。
秦风 发表于 2012-2-19 12:36 static/image/common/back.gif
老家是山东一个县城，城乡总共才77万人口。近年来提出要建设成50万人口的鲁中中等城市，城区扩大好多倍， ...
一般来说，小产权房社区只要里面住的人多，政府也就无可奈何，只能默认或者把它转正！
yt991593 发表于 2012-2-19 11:21 static/image/common/back.gif
提供一个案例，昌平区沙河镇白各庄，去年村委会和开发商合伙盖了一片小产权房，五证全无。今年，区政府的 ...
我想这种创造模式会越来越多。
山水又相逢 发表于 2012-2-19 11:49 static/image/common/back.gif
我觉得这就是模型问题，书本永远不可能模拟出跟现实同构的模型。所以书本上的答案是根据简化条件后得出的 ...
可是书生经常指点江山，激扬文字，认为不照他们想法干，都该死。
秦风 发表于 2012-2-19 12:36 static/image/common/back.gif
老家是山东一个县城，城乡总共才77万人口。近年来提出要建设成50万人口的鲁中中等城市，城区扩大好多倍， ...
其实这种所谓城市，就是披了马甲的乡下。所以怎么搞都无所谓。
xczjy 发表于 2012-2-19 14:42 static/image/common/back.gif
忙总能给解惑一下这个报道的内涵吗?
据伊朗《德黑兰时报》2月18日报道，伊朗国家石油公司（NIOC）和中国 ...
这个没什么，西方不要伊朗石油，他总得找买家，中国有人贪便宜而已。当然我们不怕或不鸟西方制裁也是一个原因。
本帖最后由 lucidus 于 2012-2-19 21:33 编辑
Brzezinski 赶着在Foreign Affairs 又贴了张大字报，不知他对美实际政策有多大影响力。
几点读后的疑问：
1 。慢慢要把日本一点点卖了？
2。承认以第一岛链为势力范围的分界？
-----------------------------------------------
Balancing the East, Upgrading the West
U.S. Grand Strategy in an Age of Upheaval
By Zbigniew Brzezinski
The United States' central challenge over the next several decades is to revitalize itself, while promoting a larger West and buttressing a complex balance in the East that can accommodate China's rising global status. A successful U.S. effort to enlarge the West, making it the world's most stable and democratic zone, would seek to combine power with principle. A cooperative larger West--extending from North America and Europe through Eurasia (by eventually embracing Russia and Turkey), all the way to Japan and South Korea--would enhance the appeal of the West's core principles for other cultures, thus encouraging the gradual emergence of a universal democratic political culture.
At the same time, the United States should continue to engage cooperatively in the economically dynamic but also potentially conflicted East. If the United States and China can accommodate each other on a broad range of issues, the prospects for stability in Asia will be greatly increased. That is especially likely if the United States can encourage a genuine reconciliation between China and Japan while mitigating the growing rivalry between China and India.
To respond effectively in both the western and eastern parts of Eurasia, the world's central and most critical continent, the United States must play a dual role. It must be the promoter and guarantor of greater and broader unity in the West, and it must be the balancer and conciliator between the major powers in the East. Both roles are essential, and each is needed to reinforce the other. But to have the credibility and the capacity to pursue both successfully, the United States must show the world that it has the will to renovate itself at home. Americans must place greater emphasis on the more subtle dimensions of national power, such as innovation, education, the balance of force and diplomacy, and the quality of political leadership.
A LARGER WEST
For the United States to succeed as the promoter and guarantor of a renewed West, it will need to maintain close ties with Europe, continue its commitment to NATO, and manage, along with Europe, a step-by-step process of welcoming both Turkey and a truly democratizing Russia into the West. To guarantee the West's geopolitical relevance, Washington must remain active in European security. It must also encourage the deeper unification of the European Union: the close cooperation among France, Germany, and the United Kingdom-- Europe's central political, economic, and military alignment--should continue and broaden.
To engage Russia while safeguarding Western unity, the French-German-Polish consultative triangle could play a constructive role in advancing the ongoing but still tenuous reconciliation between Poland and Russia. The EU's backing would help make Russian-Polish reconciliation more comprehensive, much as the German-Polish one has already become, with both reconciliations contributing to greater stability in Europe. But in order for Russian-Polish reconciliation to endure, it has to move from the governmental level to the social level, through extensive people-to-people contacts and joint educational initiatives. Expedient accommodations made by governments that are not grounded in basic changes in popular attitudes will not last. The model should be the French-German friendship after World War II, which was initiated at the highest political levels by Paris and Bonn and successfully promoted on the social and cultural level, as well.
As the United States and Europe seek to enlarge the West, Russia itself will have to evolve in order to become more closely linked with the EU. Its leadership will have to face the fact that Russia's future will be uncertain if it remains a relatively empty and underdeveloped space between the rich West and the dynamic East. This will not change even if Russia entices some Central Asian states to join Prime Minister Vladimir Putin's quaint idea of a Eurasian Union. Also, although a significant portion of the Russian public is ahead of its government in favoring EU membership, most Russians are unaware of how exacting many of the qualifying standards for membership are, especially with regard to democratic reform.
The process of the EU and Russia coming closer is likely to stall occasionally and then lurch forward again, progressing in stages and including transitional arrangements. To the extent possible, it should proceed simultaneously on the social, economic, political, and security levels. One can envisage more and more opportunities for social interactions, increasingly similar legal and constitutional arrangements, joint security exercises between NATO and the Russian military, and new institutions for coordinating policy within a continually expanding West, all resulting in Russia's increasing readiness for eventual membership in the EU.
It is not unrealistic to imagine a larger configuration of the West emerging after 2025. In the course of the next several decades, Russia could embark on a comprehensive law-based democratic transformation compatible with both EU and NATO standards, and Turkey could become a full member of the EU, putting both countries on their way to integration with the transatlantic community. But even before that occurs, a deepening geopolitical community of interest could arise among the United States, Europe (including Turkey), and Russia. Since any westward gravitation by Russia would likely be preceded and encouraged by closer ties between Ukraine and the EU, the institutional seat for a collective consultative organ (or perhaps initially for an expanded Council of Europe) could be located in Kiev, the ancient capital of Kievan Rus, whose location would be symbolic of the West's renewed vitality and enlarging scope.
If the United States does not promote the emergence of an enlarged West, dire consequences could follow: historical resentments could come back to life, new conflicts of interest could arise, and shortsighted competitive partnerships could take shape. Russia could exploit its energy assets and, emboldened by Western disunity, seek to quickly absorb Ukraine, reawakening its own imperial ambitions and contributing to greater international disarray. With the EU passive, individual European states, in search of greater commercial opportunities, could then seek their own accommodations with Russia. One can envisage a scenario in which economic self-interest leads Germany or Italy, for example, to develop a special relationship with Russia. France and the United Kingdom could then draw closer while viewing Germany askance, with Poland and the Baltic states desperately pleading for additional U. S. security guarantees. The result would be not a new and more vital West but rather a progressively splintering and increasingly pessimistic West.
THE COMPLEX, EAST
Such a disunited West would not be able to compete with China for global relevance. So far, China has not articulated an ideological dogma that would make its recent performance appear universally applicable, and the United States has been careful not to make ideology the central focus of its relations with China. Wisely, both Washington and Beijing have embraced the concept of a "constructive partnership" in global affairs, and the United States, although critical of China's violations of human rights, has been careful not to stigmatize the Chinese socioeconomic system as a whole.
But if an anxious United States and an overconfident China were to slide into increasing political hostility, it is more than likely that both countries would face off in a mutually destructive ideological conflict. Washington would argue that Beijing's success is based on tyranny and is damaging to the United States' economic well-being; Beijing, meanwhile, would interpret that U.S. message as an attempt to undermine and possibly even fragment the Chinese system. At the same time, China would stress its successful rejection of Western supremacy, appealing to those in the developing world who already subscribe to a historical narrative highly hostile to the West in general and to the United States in particular. Such a scenario would be damaging and counterproductive for both countries. Hence, intelligent self-interest should prompt the United States and China to exercise ideological self-restraint, resisting the temptation to universalize the distinctive features of their respective socioeconomic systems and to demonize each other.
The U.S. role in Asia should be that of regional balancer, replicating the role played by the United Kingdom in intra-European politics during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The United States can and should help Asian states avoid a struggle for regional domination by mediating conflicts and offsetting power imbalances among potential rivals. In doing so, it should respect China's special historic and geopolitical role in maintaining stability on the Far Eastern mainland. Engaging with China in a dialogue regarding regional stability would not only help reduce the possibility of U.S.-Chinese conflicts but also diminish the probability of miscalculation between China and Japan, or China and India, and even at some point between China and Russia over the resources and independent status of the Central Asian states. Thus, the United States' balancing engagement in Asia is ultimately in China's interest, as well.
At the same time, the United States must recognize that stability in Asia can no longer be imposed by a non-Asian power, least of all by the direct application of U. S. military power. Indeed, U. S. efforts to buttress Asian stability could prove self-defeating, propelling Washington into a costly repeat of its recent wars, potentially even resulting in a replay of the tragic events of Europe in the twentieth century. If the United States fashioned an anti-Chinese alliance with India (or, less likely, with Vietnam) or promoted an anti-Chinese militarization in Japan, it could generate dangerous mutual resentment. In the twenty-first century, geopolitical equilibrium on the Asian mainland cannot depend on external military alliances with non-Asian powers.
The guiding principle of the United States' foreign policy in Asia should be to uphold U.S. obligations to Japan and South Korea while not allowing itself to be drawn into a war between Asian powers on the mainland. The United States has been entrenched in Japan and South Korea for more than 50 years, and the independence and the self-confidence of these countries would be shattered--along with the U.S. role in the Pacific--if any doubts were to arise regarding the durability of long-standing U.S. treaty commitments.
The U.S.-Japanese relationship is particularly vital and should be the springboard for a concerted effort to develop a U.S.-Japanese-Chinese cooperative triangle. Such a triangle would provide a structure that could deal with strategic concerns resulting from China's increased regional presence. Just as political stability in Europe after World War II would not have developed without the progressive expansion of French-German reconciliation to German-Polish reconciliation, so, too, the deliberate nurturing of a deepening Chinese-Japanese relationship could serve as the point of departure for greater stability in the Far East.
In the context of this triangular relationship, Chinese-Japanese reconciliation would help enhance and solidify more comprehensive U.S.-Chinese cooperation. China knows that the United States' commitment to Japan is steadfast, that the bond between the two countries is deep and genuine, and that Japan's security is directly dependent on the United States. And knowing that a conflict with China would be mutually destructive, Tokyo understands that U.S. engagement with China is indirectly a contribution to Japan's own security. In that context, China should not view U.S. support for Japan's security as a threat, nor should Japan view the pursuit of a closer and more extensive U.S.-Chinese partnership as a danger to its own interests. A deepening triangular relationship could also diminish Japanese concerns over the yuan's eventually becoming the world's third reserve currency, thereby further consolidating China's stake in the existing international system and mitigating U.S. anxieties over China's future role.
Given such a setting of enhanced regional accommodation and assuming the expansion of the bilateral U.S.-Chinese relationship, three sensitive U.S.-Chinese issues will have to be peacefully resolved: the first in the near future, the second over the course of the next several years, and the third probably within a decade or so. First, the United States should reassess its reconnaissance operations on the edges of Chinese territorial waters, as well as the periodic U.S. naval patrols within international waters that are also part of the Chinese economic zone. They are as provocative to Beijing as the reverse situation would be to Washington. Moreover, the U.S. military's air reconnaissance missions pose serious risks of unintentional collisions, since the Chinese air force usually responds to such missions by sending up fighter planes for up-close inspection and sometimes harassment of the U.S. planes.
Second, given that the continuing modernization of China's military capabilities could eventually give rise to legitimate U.S. security concerns, including over U.S. commitments to Japan and South Korea, the United States and China should engage in regular consultations regarding their long-term military planning and seek to craft measures of reciprocal reassurance.
Third, the future status of Taiwan could become the most contentious issue between the two countries. Washington no longer recognizes Taiwan as a sovereign state and acknowledges Beijing's view that China and Taiwan are part of a single nation. But at the same time, the United States sells weapons to Taiwan. Thus, any long-term U.S.-Chinese accommodation will have to address the fact that a separate Taiwan, protected indefinitely by U.S. arms sales, will provoke intensifying Chinese hostility. An eventual resolution along the lines of former Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping's well-known formula for Hong Kong of "one country, two systems," but redefined as "one country, several systems," may provide the basis for Taipei's eventual reassociation with China, while still allowing Taiwan and China to maintain distinctive political, social, and military arrangements (in particular, excluding the deployment of People's Liberation Army troops on the island). Regardless of the exact formula, given China's growing power and the greatly expanding social links between Taiwan and the mainland, it is doubtful that Taiwan can indefinitely avoid a more formal connection with China.
TOWARD RECIPROCAL COOPERATION
More than 1,500 years ago, during the first half of the first millennium, the politics of the relatively civilized parts of Europe were largely dominated by the coexistence of the two distinct western and eastern halves of the Roman Empire. The Western Empire, with its capital most of the time in Rome, was beset by conflicts with marauding barbarians. With its troops permanently stationed abroad in extensive and expensive fortifications, Rome was politically overextended and came close to bankruptcy midway through the fifth century. Meanwhile, divisive conflicts between Christians and pagans sapped Rome's social cohesion, and heavy taxation and corruption crippled its economic vitality. In 476, with the killing of Romulus Augustulus by the barbarians, the by then moribund Western Roman Empire officially collapsed.
During the same period, the Eastern Roman Empire--soon to become known as Byzantium--exhibited more dynamic urban and economic growth and proved more successful in its diplomatic and security policies. After the fall of Rome, Byzantium continued to thrive for centuries. It reconquered parts of the old Western Empire and lived on (although later through much conflict) until the rise of the Ottoman Turks in the fifteenth century.
Rome's dire travails in the middle of the fifth century did not damage Byzantium's more hopeful prospects, because in those days, the world was compartmentalized into distinct segments that were geographically isolated and politically and economically insulated from one another. The fate of one did not directly and immediately affect the prospects of the other. But that is no longer the case. Today, with distance made irrelevant by the immediacy of communications and the near-instant speed of financial transactions, the well-being of the most advanced parts of the world is becoming increasingly interdependent. In our time, unlike 1,500 years ago, the West and the East cannot keep aloof from each other: their relationship can only be either reciprocally cooperative or mutually damaging.
wxmang 发表于 2012-2-19 17:40 static/image/common/back.gif
其实这种所谓城市，就是披了马甲的乡下。所以怎么搞都无所谓。
哈哈，忙总点评很到位。想做城市，起码在个人素质方面，还差得远
秦风 发表于 2012-2-19 21:50 static/image/common/back.gif
哈哈，忙总点评很到位。想做城市，起码在个人素质方面，还差得远
支撑一个城市必须有主导产业，光靠收点工商税是自称不起来的。
lucidus 发表于 2012-2-19 21:11 static/image/common/back.gif
Brzezinski 赶着在Foreign Affairs 又贴了张大字报，不知他对美实际政策有多大影响力。
几点读后的疑问：
...
布热津斯基还有相当影响力，是奥巴马的支撑之一，不过这篇文章有点忽悠我们，因为最近一年对我们的威慑和压制不是削弱而是加强了。
wxmang 发表于 2012-2-19 22:52 static/image/common/back.gif
支撑一个城市必须有主导产业，光靠收点工商税是自称不起来的。
恩，忙总说到主导产业。本地倒有个大型的纺织企业，号称世界第一大了，有职工17万人，还涉足些其他产业，例如电解炉什么的。据报道销售收入能到1500亿元，不知道是吹牛否。本地经济发展几乎靠这个企业支撑，在本地，这个企业老板就像汉初的豪强势力了~~~但是像这种传统产业，能支撑多久呢~~
武当七瞎 发表于 2012-2-18 21:20 static/image/common/back.gif
你这个牛，看来有实际斗争经验。
没有。反正报纸上报道的基本上都是最后一个钉子户。
抢打出头鸟，老祖宗的至理名言呀。
本帖最后由 lucidus 于 2012-2-20 00:41 编辑
wxmang 发表于 2012-2-19 23:08 static/image/common/back.gif
布热津斯基还有相当影响力，是奥巴马的支撑之一，不过这篇文章有点忽悠我们，因为最近一年对我们的威慑和 ...
确实是这样，不过美国历来有这样的习惯，就是在意识到一个位置守的成本太大后， 会暂时在这个位置上加力，以此作为谈判的筹码，桌上拿到好处后军事上再后退，国内也好交待。从这方面看，这篇文章好像有提醒议员们要配合政府的大棋的意思。
所以我的疑问就是，就忽悠对象来说，这篇文章是对我们的还是对内的？ 如果是为了增加筹码,他们想换到什么好处?我们可不可以Call their bluff? 或者说这恰恰是我们在做的,他们折腾他们的,我们自己练功?
wxmang 发表于 2012-2-19 23:08 static/image/common/back.gif
布热津斯基还有相当影响力，是奥巴马的支撑之一，不过这篇文章有点忽悠我们，因为最近一年对我们的威慑和 ...
他搞大西方很明显是考虑到了文明的对抗
lucidus 发表于 2012-2-20 00:33 static/image/common/back.gif
确实是这样，不过美国历来有这样的习惯，就是在意识到一个位置守的成本太大后， 会暂时在这个位置上加力， ...
他这个怎么算bluff。你要考虑到他的年龄，基本上这本书就是写给后代的建议了，也就是说，是未来50年到100年甚至更长期的考虑。从长远上讲，美国要同中国对抗，靠自己是肯定不行，人口基数就没有。如果不整合成大西方，最后就是被中国各个击破。缠主不也说过，人口是中国最大的优势。
中石头 发表于 2012-2-16 13:07 static/image/common/back.gif
”美国想搞G2，中国想结婚。"
结婚后，劳动所得变成夫妻共同财产了。难道真要统治阶级联合战线了啊。{:s ...
早就是统一战线了。
wxmang 发表于 2012-2-16 13:15 static/image/common/back.gif
结婚就是要名分，要稳定，不能经常出去勾三搭四。
其实还真的和结婚一样，只有大家门当户对了才好都开心，现在这种一方比较强的肯定不愿意套牢。