读A PARTNERSHIP OF EQUALS
这篇文章主要是说:1.美国人怎么看待中国的崛起，在中国崛起的过程中，怎么样不损坏自己的利益，又能最大限度的利用中国。
2.中国不甘于在美国人的指导下做事情，时时刻刻走自己去的路，这是让美国人头疼。
3.随时随刻用各种利益引诱中国，时时刻刻也在用各种机会，比如汇率，比如贸易制裁来打压中国。不过，好像发现能够用来打压中国的筹码越来越少。
这是忙总以前建议大家看的十篇文章之一，在网上搜不到中文版。由于本身英文水平差，尝试翻译下来，放在这里。有劳大家指点:
1.对我的翻译理解做出指点，让我能够改进阅读理解水平。
2.如作者说的，有些观点是在2004年浮现，这篇文章是2008年发表。对这种国际策略应用的点评，可以结合这些年发生过，正在发生的事情做些点评。
二楼开始上文章。 A partnership of Equals
How Washington Should Respond to China’s Economic Challenge
平等合伙人
华盛顿如何应对中国的经济挑战
C.Fred Bergsten
To be an economic superpower, a country must be sufficiently large, dynamic, and globally integrated to have a major impact on the world economy. Three political entities currently qualify: the United States, the European Union, and China. Inducing China to become a responsible pillar of the global economic system(as the other two are) will be one of the great challenges of coming decades—particularly since at the moment China seems uninterested in playing such a role.
The United States remains the world’s largest national economy, the issuer of its key currency, and in most years the leading source and recipient of foreign investment. The EU now has an even larger economy and even greater trade flows with the outside world, and the euro increasingly competes with the dollar as a global currency. China, the newest member of the club, is smaller than the other two but is growing more quickly and is more deeply integrated into the global economy. Its dramatic expansion is therefore having a powerful effect on the rest of the world.(China is often paired with India in such discussions, but India’s GDP is less than half of China’s. The value of the annual growth of China’s trade exceeds the total annual value of India’s trade. China will dominate its Asian neighbor for the foreseeable future.)
China poses a unique challenge because it is still poor, significantly nonmarketized, and authoritarian. All three characteristics reduce the likelihood that it will easily accept the systemic responsibilities that should ideally accompany superpower status. The integration of China into the existing global economic order will thus be more difficult than was, say, the integration of Japan a generation ago. The United States and the EU would like to co-opt China by integrating it into the regime that they have built and defended over the last several decades. There are increasing signs, however, that China has a different objective. In numerous areas, it is pursuing strategies that conflict with existing norms, rules, and institutional arrangements.
Some take this lightly, viewing it as simply the usual free-riding and skirting of responsibility by a powerful newcomer cleverly exploiting the loopholes and weak enforecement of existing international rules to pursue its perceived national interests. After all, they say, even the United States and the EU do the same on occasion, as do other major emerging-market economies. And to be sure there is no evidence that China’s challenges to the current economic order derive form any cohesive or comprehensive strategy concocted by the country’s political or intellectural leadership. Despite calls in Beijing for “a new international economic order” and talk of how a “Beijing consensus” might supplant the so-called Washington consensus, to date China’s proposed alternative approaches do not add up to a revisionist challenge to the status quo.
Nevertheless, the situation is worrisome. Given its status as a powerful newcomer benefiting from an efficient economic order, China actually has a profound interest in seeing that the international rules and institutions function effectively. It should be trying to strengthen the system, whether the present version or an alternative version more to its liking.
Moreover, Chinese recalcitrance seems to be increasing rather than decreasing over time. At the outset of its economic reform process, in the late 1970s, China was eager to join (and to replace Taiwan in) the International Monetary Fund(IMF) and the World Bank. These institutional ties subsequently played important, and apparently welcome, roles in China’s early development success. Later, Beijing not only endured lengthy negotiations and an ever-expanding set of requirements in order to join the World Trade Organization (WTO) but also used the pro-market rules of that institution to overcome resistance to reform among die-hards inside China itself.
But a country’s attitudes can change dramatically along with its circumstances. Russia, for example, was a supplicant for international capital and support after its bankruptcy in 1998 and with world oil prices near $20 a barrel, but it is aggressively pursuing a resumption of great-power status now that it has recovered and with oil over $100 a barrel. China appears to be undergoing a similar evolution, albeit with a more cautious leadership and an incremental style. It is also experiencing the same internal backlash against globalization as have the United States and many other countries. This attitudinal shift simply has to be reversed, even if doing so requires a fundamental adjustment of the international economic architecture.
要成为一个超级经济强国，必须满足的条件：地域足够大、政局稳定、融入全球化且对世界有举足轻重的影响力。目前有三个经济体完美适合：美国、欧洲、中国。促使中国与其它两个经济体一样，成为负责任的全球经济体一极，将会是来几十年巨大的挑战之一，特别是在目前，中国并没有兴趣来扮演这一角色。
美国依然是世界上最大的国民经济体、货币发行者、多年引领之源，以及外资投资受益者。欧盟现在拥用较大的经济体，更强对外贸易流通，以及欧元与美元竞争国际货币日益加剧。中国，这个俱乐部的最新成员，虽然远远比不上其它两大经济实体总量，但成长非常快速，在全球经济一体化中，更加深入。中国实力显着的扩张对世界上其它国家产生如此巨大的影响。中国经常拿来和印度比较，在有关讨论中，印度的国民生产总值不够中国一半，但中国每年贸易增长值已超出印度全年贸易总值 。在可以预见的将来，中国对比她的邻居印度，拥有压倒性的优势。
中国展示出了一个独特的挑战：依然贫穷、明显地非市场化经济、独裁。三个特殊情况减少了中国会轻易地接受与其它超级经济体国家一致的责任体系可能性。中国融入现有全球经济秩序会比上一代日本的融入更加困难。美国，欧洲更希望指导中国融入已建立好的、并且被保护了几十年的经济体系中。越来越多的信号表明，并不安于欧美指导的中国有着不同的目标，在许多领域，在不断地追求尝试突破现有标准、制度以及规则制定安排。
有些行为轻微，从简单的搭便车行为，到回避超级强权的责任，作为一个新进者，聪明地发现并利用现有国际秩序的漏洞和薄弱环节，来追求他们所理解的国家利益。之后，他们说，欧美偶尔也这样做，其它主要的新兴市场经济也这么做。可以确认的事，没有证据表明，对现有经济秩序的挑战是源自中国政治或者智囊领导层有过相关统一规划的整体战略。尽管北京对于“一个新的国际经济秩序”的呼声很高，以及“北京共识”可能会替代“华盛顿共识”的谈论，来赶上中国的替代路径建议，不再加入修正主义对现状的挑战。
话虽如此，情况依然会令人担忧，作为一个有超级实力的新进者，在有效率的经济制度中，不断获得巨大好处，中国有极浓厚的兴趣看到，国际秩序和规则有效地发挥作用，他一定会尝试加强这个体系，无论是现有的或者是中国更喜欢的替代版本。
更多的是，随着时间的前进，中国人的反抗意识正在增加，而不是减少。在经济改革进程的最初阶段的1970年代末，中国热切希望加入(替代台湾加入)国际货币基金组织和世界银行。这些机构关系紧密，明显受到欢迎，并且在中国发展的早几年，扮演了重要的角色。稍后，北京为了加入世界贸易组织，不仅容忍了漫长的谈判，以及没完没了的要价，而且采取了市场主义原则，克服了反对声音，以及改革自身内部的死硬派。
但是一个国家的姿态会跟随周围环境变化，而明显改变。比如俄罗斯在1998年政府破产后，国际原油跌到将近$20一桶，是国际资本和援助的恳求者，但在油价超过$100一桶之后，他便更激进地谋求恢复超级强权，并且已经复苏。中国表现出同样的进程，尽管有小心翼翼的领导层，以及不断增值模式。同样经历了内部反对，对于国际化，与美国和许多其它国家一样，这种姿态的简单改变，必须彻底，甚至需要对国际经济架构进行调整。 TOWARD AN ASIAN BLOC?
走向亚洲联盟
On trade, China has been playing at best a passive and at worst a disruptive role. It makes no effort to hide its current preference for low-quality, politically motivated bilateral and regional trade arrangements rather than economically meaningful (and demanding) multilateral trade liberalization through the WTO. Since China is the world’s largest surplus country and second largest exporter, this poses two important challenges to the existing global regime.
First, China’s refusal to contribute positively to the Doha Round of international trade negotiations has all but ensured the talks’ failure. Beijing has declared that it should have no liberalization obligations whatsoever and has invented a new category of WTO membership (“recently acceded members”) to justify its recalcitrance. Such a stance by a major trading power is akin to abstention and has practically guaranteed that the Doha negotiations will go nowhere. And since the global trading system does not stay in place, but is always moving either forward or backward, a collapse of the Doha Round would be quite serious: it would represent the first failure of a major multilateral trade negotiation in the postwar period and place the entire WTO system in jeopardy. China is not the only culprit in the Doha drama, of course. The United States and the EU have been unwilling to abandon their agricultural protectionism, other important emerging economies have bee unwilling to meaningfully open their markets, and several poor countries have resisted contributing to a global package of reforms. But China, with its major stake in open trade, exhibits the sharpest contrast of all the major players between its objective interests and its revealed policy.
Second, China’s pursuit of bilateral and regional trade agreements with neighboring countries is more about politics than economics. Its “free-trade agreement” with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations(ASEAN), for example, covers only a small share of its commerce with the countries in question; it is simply an effort to calm their fears of being swamped by their huge neighbor. Again, it is true that the United States and other major trading powers also factor foreign policy considerations into their selections of partners for regional and bilateral trade agreements. But they also insist on economic standards that largely conform to the WTO’s rule. China is able to escape legal application of those rules by continuing to declare itself a “developing country” and by taking advantage of “special and differential treatment.” But for a major global trading power to hide behind such loopholes provokes substantial international strains.
China is also hurting the global trading system by supporting the creation of a loose but potent Asian trading bloc. The network of regional agreements that started with one between China and ASEAN has steadily expanded to include virtually all other possible Asian permutations: parallel Japanese-ASEAN and South Korean-ASEAN deals; various bilateral partnerships, including perhaps a Chinese-Indian one; a “10+3”arrangement that brings together the ten ASEAN countries and all three Northeast Asian countries, and possibly even a “10+6” agreement that would broaden the group to include Australia, India, and New Zealand. All this activity is likely to produce, within the next decade, an East Asian free-trade area led by China.
Such a regional grouping would almost certainly trigger a sharp backlash from the United States and the EU, as well as from numerous developing countries, because of its new discrimination against them. Even more important, it would create a tripolar global economic regime—a configuration that could threaten existing global arrangements and multilateral cooperation.
China’s challenges to the global trading system are most visible in its opposition to the U.S. proposal, launched at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum in 2006, for a free-tradearea of the Asia-Pacific. The APEC initiative, immediately endorsed by a number of those smaller member economies that fervently want to prevent trade conflict between the group’s two superpowers, seeks to head off the looming confrontation between an Asia-only trading bloc and the United States, which could draw a line down the middle of the Pacific. The initiative would eventually consolidate the many preferential pacts in the Asia-Pacific region and offer an economically meaningful Plan B for widespread trade liberalization if the Doha Round definitively fails. China has led the opposition to the idea, demonstrating its preference for bilateral deals with minimal economic content and its lack of interest in trying to defend the broader trading order.
在贸易上，中国扮演了一个消极，破坏规则的极坏角色，没有任何努力来掩饰现在低质、政治驱动的双边贸易安排，而不是实现在WTO框架下按多边自由贸易。因为中国是世界最大的顺差国，同时也是第二大出口国，这给世界现存全球格局带来了两大挑战。
第一，中国在多哈回合国际贸易协商拒绝表示出积极态度，以致于谈判以失败告终。北京已申明不会有任何自由主义责任，并且发明了一个新的成员关系(新加入成员}，来证明他的对抗。贸易大国的这一种姿态返似于弃权，有力地保证了多哈协商无疾而终。因为国际贸易体系并非原地不动，而是朝前或后发展，一次多哈回合的崩溃，会有非常严重的后果，可能表示战后期间第一次多边贸易协议以失败告终，并且，将整个世贸组织置于危险的地步。当然不只是中国在多哈舞台中“犯罪”，美国、欧盟不原意放弃他们的农业保护主义，其它重要的新兴经济不愿长远地开放他们的市场，一些贫穷国家坚持要得到全球性的改革方案。在贸易开放中，有差巨大标杆作用的中国，在所有大的对手中，他的实际利益和公开的政策有着鲜明的反差。
第二，中国与领国追求的双边或者区域贸易协议，更多的是政治而不是经济。比如，中国与东盟推行自由贸易协议，与有争疑的国家，只拿了了一小部分利益，只是为了平复他们会被大国围困的担心。再说，美国以及其它一些大的贸易国同样将其外交政策考虑分解到他们与伙伴的区域或者双边贸易协议选项中。但是，他们依然坚持在经济标准上，要最大限度地与世贸协议规则保持一致，中国能从正式规则中逃避、通过申明自已是发展中国家，以及得到特殊不同的好处。但是对于一个超级全球性大国来说，躲在这样的漏洞后面，只会激怒潜在的国际势力。
中国损害国际贸易还表现在：通过支持一个松散但有效的亚洲贸易联盟。区域性的贸易协议从单对单到东盟，平行于日本--东盟、韩国—东盟、协议，各种类型的双边关系，也许包括中印一体化，10+3协议，把10个东亚国家以及其它3个东北亚国家绑在一起，也许甚至有一个10+6协议，将会涉足澳大利亚、印度、以及新西兰。所有这些行动很可能会导致：在下一个20年，中国将会领导东亚自由贸易区。
如此之类的区域组织由于对欧美产生了新的歧视，将会产生美欧以及为数不少的发展中国家的强烈反对。更重要的是，可能会产生三极经济结构—确定会威胁到现有国际经济秩序安排，以及多边合作关系。
中国对于国际贸易体系的挑战，从2006年启动的亚太经济合作论坛，讨论亚太自由贸易区，就已经明显地表现出了和美国建议的对立。亚太经合组织初步确定了为数不少的小经济体的支持 ，热烈地希望避免两大超级经济体的贸易冲突，寻找阻止亚洲贸易体和美国之间的潜在冲突。以太平洋中心划洋而治。初步协议会最终巩固亚太许多优先条款，并且提供了一个备份计划，在多哈回合明确告吹。中国反对这个提法，证明其对小经济体双边贸易比较重视，缺少兴趣去保护更广阔的贸易秩序。
TRASHING THE IMF?
抛弃国际货币基金组织
China’s challenge to the international monetary order, meanwhile, is at least as serious. Alone among the world’s major economies, China has rejected the adoption of a flexible exchange-rate policy, which would promote adjustment of its balance-of –payments position and avoid a buildup of large imbalances. Under IMF rules, China has the right to peg its currency—but it does not have the right to intervene massively in the foreign exchange market, as it has for the past five years, to maintain a hugely undervalued yuan and thereby boost its international competitive position. This violates the most basic norms of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, which require members to “avoid manipulating cxchange rates… in order to prvent effective balance of payments adjustment or to gain unfair competitive advantage.” It is also a violation of the IMF’s implementing guidelines, which explicitly proscribe the use of “prolonged, large-scale one-way” interventions to maintain competitive undervaluation.
The results are unprecedented for a major trading country. China’s current account surplus has reached 11-12 percent of its GDP. By next year, its annual global surplus could approach $500 billion, approximating the value of the U.S. current account deficit. Its hoard of foreign currency exceeds $1.6 trillion and is by far the world’s largest. These imbalances and the unprecedented flow of international funds that they require could trigger a crash of the dollar and a “hard landing” for the global economy, severely compounding the current global financial crisis.
Previous surplus countries, notably Germany in the 1960s and 1970s and Japan in the 1970s and 1980s, have also resisted making necessary and inevitable adjustments to their currency pegs. But no earlier imbalances have ever approached the current Chinese one in terms of its share of the country’s GDP. Moreover, all of these countries eventually agreed to conform to the international rules.
To date, however, China has resisted all entreaties to alter its behavior. Its announced move to “a managed floating exchange rate based on market supply and demand” in July 2005 has still not produced any significant rise in the trade-weighted value of its currency, despite the recent acceleration of the yuan’s appreciation against the dollar, nor has it prevented continued huge surpluses in China’s external accounts. The number of interventions in the currency markets that China has undertaken to block faster appreciation of the yuan has at least doubled since that time.
China has actually questioned the basic concept of international cooperation in dealing with these problems, claiming that a country’s exchange rate is “an issue of national sovereignty”(rather than a quintessentially international concern in which foreign parties have an equal interest). It has objected even to the IMF’s consideration of the issue. Its actions have raised an implicit threat that it might promoted the creation of an Asian Monetary Fund, further eroding the global role of the IMF, and may seek a regional or even global role for its national currency over the long term. These monetary steps intensify the challenge to the global trading system because large exchange-rate misalignments are a potent stimulus for protectionism in deficit countries, as indicated at present by the numerous bills in Congress to address the China currency issue with trade sanctions.
On energy (China will shortly become the world’s largest consumer of energy), the challenge China poses is less frontal, but only because there exists no body of agreed global doctrine, rules, and institutions. There are at least two conflicting energy regimes, the(periodically effective) producer cartel embodied in the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries and the (very loose and incomplete) consumer anti-cartel embodied in the International Energy Agency. China is creating problems for both with its drive to line up “secure sources of supply” through long-term contracts with selected producing countries. It is unwilling to rely solely, or even primarily, on market mechanisms, attempting to insure itself against toth output interruptions by the producers and the market power of other large consumers.
Here, as elsewhere, China is hardly alone in its behavior. But as the driving force behind the single most important commodity market in the world, the country has a particular interest in (and responsibility for) forging systemic responses rather than trying to carve out exceptions and special privileges for itself. China appears to be either unaware of the abject failure of such strategies in the past or confident that its contemporary clout will suffice to sustain its contractual arrangements even in difficult periods, and it is pursuing such strategies with respect to other raw materials as well as oil and gas.
On foreign aid, China may have already become the largest national donor (depending on how “aid” is defined), and it is posing a direct challenge to prevailing norms by ignoring the types of conditionality that have evolved throughout the donor community over the past quarter century. Beijing rejects not only the social standards (on human rights, labor conditions, and the environment) that have become prevalent but also the basic economic standards (such as poverty alleviation and good governance) theat virtually all bilateral and multilateral aid agencies now require as a matter of course. As with its trade and commodity pacts, China’s “conditionality” on aid is almost wholly political: instistence that the recipient countries support China’s positions on global issues, in the United Nations and elsewhere, and funnel their primary products to China as reliable suppliers.
中国对国际货币秩序的挑战同样是比较严重的。在世界较大的经济体中，中国是唯一拒绝采取弹性汇率制度的国家。这样可以促进支付平衡地位，避免形成巨大的不平衡。在国际货币基金组织规则下 ，中国有权固定汇率，但没有权利干涉外汇交易市场。在过去的5年里，为保持大量低估的人民币来加强自身因际竞争地位，这样严重违反了IMF关于协议条款的基本规则。要求成员“避免操纵汇率”，为防止有效平衡国际收支体系或者为获取不公平的竞争优势，同样违反了IMF的执行规章。明确地提出了“延长地、大尺度、单向”介入来获取有竞争力的低估值。
对于一个大的贸易国家来说，所导致的结果是空前的水平。中国目前外汇储备已达到GDP的11-12%，在下一年中，其年度国际出超会超支5000亿美元，差不多就是美国现在的国债总额。她的外汇储备超过1.6万亿美元。在世界上遥遥领先。这些不平衡以及空前的国际基金流动，只要他们需要，可以发动对美元的崩盘冲击，以及导致国际经济硬着陆，严重地加速全球经融危机。
之前的出超大国，特别是1960年代的德国，以及1970-1980年代的日本，被强制要求对固定汇率作出必要的不可避免的调整，但没有一个可以达到中国当前的外汇所占GDP的比例，更重要的是这些国家最后同意遵守国际规则。
到现在，中国抵抗住所有来替代她现行惯例的恳求。她基于市场供求情况，采取可控的浮动汇率制度。在2005年7月，在汇率的贸易权重中还没有产生明显的上升，尽管在目前的人民币对美元增值进程中，并没有阻止中国外汇总额出超的继续增加。为阻止人民币过快的增值，中国在汇率市场干预的次数最少已经上升了两倍。
中国已经真正地质疑过国际化合作组织对待这些问题的基本理念，申称一个国家的汇率是“国家主权的一种”(而不是一个国际化关注的精髓：外国伙伴拥用相同的利益)。甚至拒绝了IMF在这个问题上的统筹考虑，她的行为显示了一个隐含的威胁，可能会促进亚洲货币基金的创建，更大地侵蚀了IMF的国际角色。对于她的国家汇率，在长期来看，可能会寻求一个区域化甚至国际化角色。这些货币措施加剧了对国际货易体系挑战，国为汇率大幅失调在赤字国家的保护主义是一个有力的刺激。犹如目前在国会发布的巨额账单的指示出，中国的汇率问题和贸易制裁。
在能源方面(中国将会在短期内成为世界上最大的能源消费国)，中国挑战的姿态就不那么前线了。不过，这里没有存在的同意的国际教条，规则，以及惯例。最少存在两种相互冲突的能源机制，由产油国(周期性影响)组成的生产联合垄断者，以及非常松散且不完整的反垄断消费者组成的国际能源组织。中国在寻求安全能源供应者，以长期合同，有选择地和产油国，对两种能源组织造成了麻烦。中国不愿依靠单一的或者主要产油国，以市场机机制，尝试确保自身，抵制由产油国和市场控制的两种产能干扰。
在这里，与其它地方一样，中国由地其本质，很难独善其身，划开是作为世界上单一的最重要的商品市场的驱动力，这国家有特定的利益诉求(或者负责任的态度)去打造系统反应，而不是尝试去塑造例外和自身特权，中国假装不知在运去战略上的惨败或者确信他的时代影响力会满足于支持其的合同安排。甚至在困难时期，他的战略追求带着尊重，对其它原材料，诸如油气一样。
对于国外援助，基于援助的如何定义，中国也许已成为最大的捐赠国。对主流模式展示了直接挑战，忽视援助团体的制约类别，在过去的1/4个世纪中。北京不仅在社会标准(人权、劳工条件、环境污染)已成为主流的社会标准，而且在基本的经济学标准，比如贫困帮扶，良好的管理事实上双边或者多边的援助机构理所当然的需要。对于她的交易和商品协议，中国的制约在援助上差不多是全部政治性的坚持受援国家在国际问题上的支持，在联合国或者其它地方，输入大宗原材料到中国市场作为可信赖的供应国。
NEW RELES OF THE GAME
新的游戏规则
What these policies demonstrate is that China’s international mindset has not kept pace with its breathtaking economic ascent. China continues to act like a small country with little impact on the global system at large and therefore little responsibility for it. Such a lag in perceptions is not difficult to understand, particularly as it regards a conswervative leadership still following Deng Xiaoping’s directive to maintain a low international profile. The central thrust of contemporary Chinese foreign policy is not to assume a large role in the world but to avoid international entanglements that could disrupt the country’s ability to focus on its huge domestic challenges. Moreover, the speed at which China has risen is difficult for even the most experienced observers to comprehend. (The pattern is similar to the one that accompanied Japan’s growth from the early 1970s into the 1980s, when its meteoric rise also triggered sharp global reactions, while Tokyo maintained a passive and reactive stance on almost all international issues.)
Even the strongest defenders of the current world trading system would concede that at least some of China’s criticisms are valid. At best, the Doha Round Will achieve only marginal liberalization of world trade after almost a decade of effort. The IMF has failed to enforce its own rules and is being forced to downsize. The World Bank has lost any clear direction. The G-7(the group of highly industrialized states) has adopted a mutual nonaggression pact among its members, making its criticisms of outiders such as China seem hypocritical. And by failing to adapt their governance structures to the dramatic changes in the relative economic power among nations, the international economic institutions have lost much of their legitimacy. The fact that some Chinese attitudes are understandable and some Chinese concerns legitimate does not lessen the significance of the challenge but rather suggests some of the logical components of an intelligent response.
To deal with the situation, Washington should make a subtle but basic change to its economic policy strategy toward Beijing. Instead of focusing on narrow bilateral problems, it should seek to develop a true partnership with Beijing so as to provide joint leadership of the global economic system. Only such a “G-2” approach will do justice, and be seen to do justice, to China’s new role as a global economic superpower and hence as a legitimate architect and steward of the international economic order.
The present U.S. approach seeks to entice China to join the existing global economic order. Washington’s fondness for the status quo is understandable given its basic success and the prominent role it accords Washington. But China is uncomfortable with the very notion of simply integrating into a system it had no role in developing. Both Chinese officials and Chinese scholars are actively discussing alternative structures for which China can be present at the creation. At one particularly contentious point in its negotiations to enter the WTO, the Chinese ambassador reportedly thundered, “We know we have to play the game your way now, but in ten years we will set the rules!” The existing system, moreover, has become increasingly sclerotic, and it might well be that the only way to overcome the enormous resistance to change (manifested in positions such as Europe’s refusal to wind down its excessive quotas and give up some of its IMF executive-board seats) is to undertake a fundamental overhaul.
Current U.S. policy also purports to include tough enforcement measures to punish noncooperation: Washington has taken Beijing to the WTO for dispute settlement on a number of occasions and has tried to mobilize the IMF and the G-7 to penalize China for its undervalued currency. But Washington’s criticism of Beijing has not been translated into any serious retaliatory pressure because too many Americans receive too many benefits from their actual or potential dealings with China for policymakers to jeopardize the relationship and because other key countries are also unwilling to confront China. Abandoning the present position and adopting a less confrontational approach might be the only way to persuade China to start cooperating.
这个政策证明了中国的国际化思维定势还没有与他突破性的经济上升保持步伐一致。中国继续扮演一个影响力不大的小国，在大的国际系统中，因此只会承担尽量小的责任。在知觉上存在如此差距是不难理解的，特别是关于传统领导人任然遵从邓小平的韬光养晦的政策。现代中国的外交政策最大推力不是要在世界舞台上谋求一个主角，而是避免各种国际事务纠缠，这样的话，会打断应付国内挑战的注意力。更多的是，就算富有经验的观察者也难以理解中国的崛起速度。这个崛起方式与日本在1970-1980’s的高增长，突然的崛起类似，东京保持负面和消极的姿态,在所有国际问题上同样引发尖锐的全球反应。
就算是对现有贸易体系的坚定拥护者对于中国的批评是正确的，最好多哈回会将会达成勉强的世界贸易自由。在10年的努力后，IMF已不坚持自已的规则，被强制缩小规模，世界银行已失去清楚的方向，代表高度工业化国家的组织G-7已签署成员国互不侵略协议，让他们对于外来国家的批评显得伪善。改变他们政府结构的失败，相关经济能力的巨大的改变，国际经济机构失去了太多正统性。
为应对这种情形，华盛顿对北京的经济政策战略必须要做出一些微妙的但是基础的改变。而不是聚焦在狭窄的双边问题，应当寻找出与北京发展出一个真正的伙伴关系，只要能够加入世界经济体系的领导者。只有诸如“G-2”的路径会达到公平，而且可以见到公平，对于中国成为世界经济强权的新角色，加强作为国际经济秩序合法的建筑者和管理者。
现行美国寻求的方法是怂恿中国加入现行的全球经济秩序。考虑到她基本性的成功和卓越的角色与华盛顿一致，华府对现状的钟爱是可以理解的。但是简单的融入一个没有参与发展的体系中，并且任何角色，这一间单的融入的真实想法，对中国是很不舒服的。中国的官员和美国的学者都在积极地商量在创建阶段中国可以参与的替代架构。一个特别的争议点在加入WTO的协商中，中国大使大声抨击，“我们知道现在我们必须按照你们的方式办事， 但是10年内，我们会制定规则。”更多的是，现行体系已变得逐渐近的僵硬，可能会成为唯一的方法，来克服巨大的反抗，针对改变（显然地在欧洲拒绝减少额外的配额，和放弃一些在IMF的董事席位），是承担了基本的检查。
现行美国政策同样旨在包括粗暴的执行措施来惩罚不合作：为了一系列场合的争端平息，华盛顿已接受北京加入WTO，以及尝试动员国际货币基金组织和七国组织来惩罚中国低估的汇率。但是，因为太多的美国人从他们现在或者潜在的与中国的交易中受惠颇多，因为其它重要的国家同样不愿意得罪中国，华盛顿对于北京的批评并没有影响到政策制定者转化为任何严重的报复性的压力来伤害中美关系。放弃目前的局面，转而采取一个更少冲突的方法，可能是唯一能够劝说中国开启合作之路。 THE BIG TWO
两巨头
In part, the strategy proposed here would treat old issues in new ways, recasting conflicts as opportunities for progress. The United States and China could agree to construct their regional trade agreements in ways that support, rather than impede, subsequent multilateral liberalization—and even permit eventual linkage between the regional bodies. Failures to offer significant new market-opening opportunities in the Doha Round would be addressed not as legitimate mercantilist behavior but as threats to the WTO that would jeopardize both countries’ stake in an open world economy. Competitive currency misalignments would be treated as deviations from IMF norms that hurt all trading partners, especially poor countries. Washington would concede that its errant fiscal policy has contributed to the overvaluation of the dollar, just as Beijing would concede that undervaluation of the yuan has reflected inadequate Chinese internal demand and excessive government intervention. The United Stateds could escort China into the International Energy Agency to help organize the response of consuming countries to high oil prices.
More far-reaching steps might involve the creation of new inter-national norms and institutional arrangements to govern issue areas that are important but currently unregulated, such as global warming and sovereign wealth funds (SWFs). To date, China has steadfastly refused to even contemplate binding constraints on its greenhouse gas emissions. So has the United States, but that stance seems likely to change dramatically after the presidential election in November, no matter who wins. An emissions regime, however, may well lead to the installation of trade barriers in participating countries. Moreover, global warming cannot be seriously addressed without China, which has become the world’s largest polluter. Unless Washington and Beijing find ways to cooperate in attacking the problem together, the result could be a trade war between them and little or no action on the environment.
China has already indicated some skepticism about the adoption of new international guidelines, even if voluntary and nonbinding, regarding the structure and investment activities of SWFs. But the United States is championing such codes in order to permit continued foreign investment and head off the risk of protectionist domestic reactions. Since the U.S. economy is especially dependent on Chinese capital, without some new agreement a frontal clash could develop over this issue, triggered either by China’s rejection of proposed new guidelines or by the United States’ rejection of Chinese investments in particularly sensitive areas.
Whether in dealing with old or new issues, the basic idea would be to develop a G-2 between the United States and China to steer the global governance process. Other major powers, such as the EU and, on some issues, Japan, would of course need to e deeply involved as well. The new rules, codes, or norms could frequently be implemented through existing multilateral institutions, such as the IMF and the WTO. Some of them might work better through new worldwide organizations created to deal with truly new issues, such as a global environmental organization to manage climate-change policy. But effective systemic defenses against international economic challenges in today’s world must start with active cooperation between its two dominant economies, the United States and China.
Given other powers’ sensitivities, of course, it would be impolitic for Washington and Beijing to use the term “G-2” publicly. But for the strategy to work, the United States would have to give true priority to China as its main partner in managing the world economy, to some extent displacing Europe. Nothing less is likely to attract China or engage the United States sufficiently to create the effective leadership that the world so desperately needs.
Some initial steps have already been taken in this direction. After I floatTHE BIG TWO
两巨头
In part, the strategy proposed here would treat old issues in new ways, recasting conflicts as opportunities for progress. The United States and China could agree to construct their regional trade agreements in ways that support, rather than impede, subsequent multilateral liberalization—and even permit eventual linkage between the regional bodies. Failures to offer significant new market-opening opportunities in the Doha Round would be addressed not as legitimate mercantilist behavior but as threats to the WTO that would jeopardize both countries’ stake in an open world economy. Competitive currency misalignments would be treated as deviations from IMF norms that hurt all trading partners, especially poor countries. Washington would concede that its errant fiscal policy has contributed to the overvaluation of the dollar, just as Beijing would concede that undervaluation of the yuan has reflected inadequate Chinese internal demand and excessive government intervention. The United Stateds could escort China into the International Energy Agency to help organize the response of consuming countries to high oil prices.
More far-reaching steps might involve the creation of new inter-national norms and institutional arrangements to govern issue areas that are important but currently unregulated, such as global warming and sovereign wealth funds (SWFs). To date, China has steadfastly refused to even contemplate binding constraints on its greenhouse gas emissions. So has the United States, but that stance seems likely to change dramatically after the presidential election in November, no matter who wins. An emissions regime, however, may well lead to the installation of trade barriers in participating countries. Moreover, global warming cannot be seriously addressed without China, which has become the world’s largest polluter. Unless Washington and Beijing find ways to cooperate in attacking the problem together, the result could be a trade war between them and little or no action on the environment.
China has already indicated some skepticism about the adoption of new international guidelines, even if voluntary and nonbinding, regarding the structure and investment activities of SWFs. But the United States is championing such codes in order to permit continued foreign investment and head off the risk of protectionist domestic reactions. Since the U.S. economy is especially dependent on Chinese capital, without some new agreement a frontal clash could develop over this issue, triggered either by China’s rejection of proposed new guidelines or by the United States’ rejection of Chinese investments in particularly sensitive areas.
Whether in dealing with old or new issues, the basic idea would be to develop a G-2 between the United States and China to steer the global governance process. Other major powers, such as the EU and, on some issues, Japan, would of course need to e deeply involved as well. The new rules, codes, or norms could frequently be implemented through existing multilateral institutions, such as the IMF and the WTO. Some of them might work better through new worldwide organizations created to deal with truly new issues, such as a global environmental organization to manage climate-change policy. But effective systemic defenses against international economic challenges in today’s world must start with active cooperation between its two dominant economies, the United States and China.
Given other powers’ sensitivities, of course, it would be impolitic for Washington and Beijing to use the term “G-2” publicly. But for the strategy to work, the United States would have to give true priority to China as its main partner in managing the world economy, to some extent displacing Europe. Nothing less is likely to attract China or engage the United States sufficiently to create the effective leadership that the world so desperately needs.
Some initial steps have already been taken in this direction. After I floatTHE BIG TWO
两巨头
In part, the strategy proposed here would treat old issues in new ways, recasting conflicts as opportunities for progress. The United States and China could agree to construct their regional trade agreements in ways that support, rather than impede, subsequent multilateral liberalization—and even permit eventual linkage between the regional bodies. Failures to offer significant new market-opening opportunities in the Doha Round would be addressed not as legitimate mercantilist behavior but as threats to the WTO that would jeopardize both countries’ stake in an open world economy. Competitive currency misalignments would be treated as deviations from IMF norms that hurt all trading partners, especially poor countries. Washington would concede that its errant fiscal policy has contributed to the overvaluation of the dollar, just as Beijing would concede that undervaluation of the yuan has reflected inadequate Chinese internal demand and excessive government intervention. The United Stateds could escort China into the International Energy Agency to help organize the response of consuming countries to high oil prices.
More far-reaching steps might involve the creation of new inter-national norms and institutional arrangements to govern issue areas that are important but currently unregulated, such as global warming and sovereign wealth funds (SWFs). To date, China has steadfastly refused to even contemplate binding constraints on its greenhouse gas emissions. So has the United States, but that stance seems likely to change dramatically after the presidential election in November, no matter who wins. An emissions regime, however, may well lead to the installation of trade barriers in participating countries. Moreover, global warming cannot be seriously addressed without China, which has become the world’s largest polluter. Unless Washington and Beijing find ways to cooperate in attacking the problem together, the result could be a trade war between them and little or no action on the environment.
China has already indicated some skepticism about the adoption of new international guidelines, even if voluntary and nonbinding, regarding the structure and investment activities of SWFs. But the United States is championing such codes in order to permit continued foreign investment and head off the risk of protectionist domestic reactions. Since the U.S. economy is especially dependent on Chinese capital, without some new agreement a frontal clash could develop over this issue, triggered either by China’s rejection of proposed new guidelines or by the United States’ rejection of Chinese investments in particularly sensitive areas.
Whether in dealing with old or new issues, the basic idea would be to develop a G-2 between the United States and China to steer the global governance process. Other major powers, such as the EU and, on some issues, Japan, would of course need to e deeply involved as well. The new rules, codes, or norms could frequently be implemented through existing multilateral institutions, such as the IMF and the WTO. Some of them might work better through new worldwide organizations created to deal with truly new issues, such as a global environmental organization to manage climate-change policy. But effective systemic defenses against international economic challenges in today’s world must start with active cooperation between its two dominant economies, the United States and China.
Given other powers’ sensitivities, of course, it would be impolitic for Washington and Beijing to use the term “G-2” publicly. But for the strategy to work, the United States would have to give true priority to China as its main partner in managing the world economy, to some extent displacing Europe. Nothing less is likely to attract China or engage the United States sufficiently to create the effective leadership that the world so desperately needs.
Some initial steps have already been taken in this direction. After I floated the idea of a G-2 in late 2004, Robert Zoellick, in his new capacity as deputy secretary of state, which he undertook in February 2005, launched initial discussions with Chinese counterparts. In 2007, Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson escalated the engagement to what is now known as the U.S.-China Strategic Economic Dialogue, which involves the leaders of ten or so cabinet agencies in each country. The beginnings of an institutional framework for a working G-2 have thus already been put in place, and patterns of cooperation are already developing on topics such as the environment and international finance. But its is not nearly enough for China to be seen as a “responsible stakeholder.” It must be seen, and accorded full rights, as a true leadership partner.
Such a relationship between a rich developed country and a poor developing one would be unprecedented in human history—as is there being a poor economic superpower, which is what China is. There are enough examples of similar cooperation on specific issues, however, to suggest that converting U.S.-Chinese disputes into systemic management issues can be extremely effective. In the late 1970s, for example, the United States was applying countervailing duties to scores of Brazilian products because Brazil’s export subsidies accounted for almost half the value of all of its foreign sales. A frontal assault on the subsidies was politically unacceptable in Brazil, but the two countries agreed to cooperate closely in negotiating a new subsidy code for the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade(the precursor to the WTO): this agreement turned out to be simultaneously the linchpin of a succeful Tokyo Round of trade talks, a basis for adding an injury clause to the U.S. countervailing-duty law, and a foundation for phasing out the Brazilian subsidy policy.
Are the United States and China ready for such a substantial reorientation? Washington would need to accept China as a true partner in managing global economic affairs, the development of an intimate working relationship with an Asian country rather than its traditional European allies, and constructive collaboration with an authoritarian political regime rather than a democracy. All these changes would pose substantial challenges for U.S. policymakers and would likely encounter domestic political resistance.
China is rapidly approaching a moment when its chosen strategy of integration into the world economy will force it to assume increased responsibility for the successful functioning of that economy. China’s own interests, in other words, should lead it to accept an invitation from the United States to help steer the system in a mutually acceptable direction. The Chinese today are hotly debating whether their country should proceed unilaterally or work within the international system, and an offer of true partnership could tilt the outcome of that debate decisively and constructively, raising the possibility that China could continue its upward trajectory without provoking the clashes that previous rising powers have.
If China is reluctant to get too close to the United States—say, because of continuing controversies over security issues—alternative institutional arrangements are of course available. The EU could be a member from the outset of a G-3, a group of the current global economic superpowers. The new G-5, recently created by the IMF to conduct its intensified multilateral consultative process, which adds Japan and Saudi Arabia(to represent the oil producers) into the mix, is another possibility. The central need is to embrace China in the context of a new and effective leadership grouping in light of its critical role in the world economy and its legitimate desire to be engaged in systemic management at all relevant stages of the process.
Under seven successive presidents, the United States has chosen to engage, rather than confront, China, taking the eminently sensible view that provoking an unnecessary confrontation would be profoundly contrary to U.S. interests. Given the signs that China’s economic advance will continue, the same logic suggests that Washington should make every effort to engage Beijing as a true partner in steering global economic affairs. At a minimum, creating a G-2 would limit the risk of bilateral disputes escalating and disrupting the U.S.-Chinese relationship and the broader global economy. At a maximum, it could start a process that might, over time, generate sufficient trust and mutual understanding to produce active cooperation on crucial issues.
Right now, the prospects of such active cooperation are uncertain. But in addition to their differences, the two countries share many common interests, and their global economic positions are converging rather than diverging. Developing a partnership of the sort outlined here will not be easy and will take much time and effort. But the issues at stake are so important that even partial success would be worthwhile, and the only way to gauge the idea’s feasibility is to try it. The upcoming negotiations to create a global strategy to counter global warming offer a compelling opportunity for just such an experiment.
在这里展示的战略将用新的方式来对待旧问题，将冲突重新包装为机会，这是一种进步。美中两国同意共建区域贸易协议的各种支持，而不是对抗，并发的多方自由化，甚至允许区域块之间的终极节点。在多哈回合不能提供明显的新的市场开放机会，将会释放不只是合理化的商业主义行为，并助是威胁到世贸组织，会伤害双方份额，在一个开放的世界经济中，竞争性的汇率不协调会被当作背离IMF标准，会伤害所有贸易伙伴，特别是贫穷国家。华盛顿会承认它错误的有助于高估美元的财政政策。如同北京承认人民币的低估反应了不适当的中国国内需求以及过度的政府干预。美国可以扶持中国进入国际能源组织，来帮助组织关于消费国的高油价回应。
更多的步调将会包括在新的国家标准创立，和制度安排中，来管理现有无明确规则但又非常重的问题，诸如全球变暖和主权财富基金。日前，在温室气体排放上，中国坚定地拒绝了甚至在打算捆绑限制。美国同样存在，但那个姿态在11月的总统选举后，无论谁赢，看起来都可能戏剧性的改变。不过一个排放体制，可能会导致参与国设立贸易壁垒。更多的是，全球变暖不能没有成为世界最大污染国的中国的隆重出席。除非华盛顿和北京找到合作之路来一起应对，结果可能是中美之间贸易战，以及在环境问题上的或多或少的行动。
中国对采取新国际指导方针，已经持着一种怀疑主义。即便是这些方针是关于SWFs 的结构和投资活动的义务性质各无捆绑条件。但是美国正在拥护这样一些政策，目的是允许连续的外国投资，阻止国内贸易保护活动的风险，国为美国经济特别依赖中国资本。如果没有协议，要么是中国拒绝了新的指导方针提案，要么是美国拒绝了中国在敏感行业的投资，可能都会导致一场正面冲突。
无论是应对新的或者旧的问题，基本理念是中美发展成为G-2，两国集团，来操纵国际事务。其它较大的政体，比如欧盟，在某一些问题上，日本当然也有深入参与。新的规则、制度、标准会频繁地通过现存的多边机构，比如IMF、WTO来实施，一些政策通过建立全球化的组织，来解决新问题，效果可能会更加好。比如，全球环境组织来管理气候变化政策。但是对于当今世界的国际化经济挑战，有效的系统化防卫，必须在中美这两个占统治地位的经济体以积极的合作。
考虑到其它政权的敏感，对于华盛顿各北京公开地用“两国集团”这个名词，当然是个失策。但是从实用的策略来看，在管理世界经济方面做为主要伙伴，美国必须给予北京真正的优先权，在某些方面代替欧洲。这样有可能吸引中国或者鼓励美国充分地创建世界迫切需要的有效领导力。
在这个方向上，有一些初步的行动已经实施。2004年尾我浮现出这个G-2想法之后，罗博特. 卓易利克, 当他于2005年接过国家秘书长这个新的职务时，同中国有关方面启动了初步的协商。2007年，财政部长享利保尔森逐步促进到现在众所周知的中美经济战略对话，包括了双方内阁十余名领导的参与。有实际意义的G-2制度框架的开始，就这样已置于合适的位置, 并且合作模式已经发展到具体的话题，诸如环境和国际财政。但是，对于中国来说，被看成“负责任的股东”是不足够的，必须看见，如同一个真正的领导者伙伴一样，遵守所有权利。
在一个富裕的发达国家和一个贫穷的发展中国家的这样一种关系，在人类历史上也是有史以来第一次, 这里作为一个贫穷经济的超级强权，就是中国。在特别问题上有相似合作的例子有许多，不过，建议转变中美争论，将对于系统管理体系问题会成为极端有效。例如，在1970年代末期，美国在对巴西产品份额实施补偿责任，国为巴西出口津贴总额差不多占了所有外国销售总值的一半。关于津贴的正面冲突，巴西在政治上完全不可接受。但两个国家同意在贸易和关税制上面紧密合作，协商一个新的津贴制度。这个协议与东京回会的贸易论坛时同步的，事后被证明是成功的关键。对于美国的补偿责任法律，这是一个基本的附加伤害条款，同是也是逐步停止巴西补贴政策的根本。
中国和美国对于如此有潜力的重新定向准备好了吗？华盛顿将要接受中国做为一个伙伴来管理国际经济事务，与亚洲国家紧密的工作关系的发展，而不是与传统的欧洲盟友；以及与独裁政治体制进行结构性的协作，而不是民主国家。所有的这些改变展示出对美国的政策制定者潜在的挑战，以及可能面对本土政治的反抗。
中国正在快速的接近选择世界经济融入战略的时机，会推动她对于经济成功的基础，假定增长的责任。在另一方面，中国自已的利益，会导致她接受一个来自美国的邀请，那就是帮助驾驭这个系统在一个互相接受的方向。今日中国正热切地争论她们的国家究竟是独自发展，还是与国际系统一起发展，一个真正的伙伴关系将会决定性的，建设性的倾向争论的结果，中国崛起的势头持续增加的可能性，不会激怒先前崛起的强权遇到的冲突。
假如中国不情愿与美国靠得太近，比如在安全问题上持续不断的争论，替代的制度安排当然就有效了。G-3，吸收欧盟加入作为成员，形成当今世界经济强权织织；新的G-5，由IMF新进创建的组织，来执行强化的多边协商程序，加入了日本和沙特(代表产油国)来掺和，将是另外一种可能。重要的需求是在新的背景和有效的领导层面热烈欢迎中国，根据其在世界经济的重要角色，以及合法需求参与在所有进程的相关层面的系统化管理体系。
历经七位连续的总统，对于中国，美国已选择了参与，而不是对抗，激起不必要的冲突将会对美国的利益造成极大的伤害，这是优秀的明智的观点。鉴于中国的经济优势将会继续的迹象，同样的作为逻辑建议，在驾驭国际经济事务上，华盛顿必须付出每一次努力将北京作为一个真正的伙伴来对待。建立一个G-2，最少可以限制双边争议升级，中美关系不会中断和全球经济扩大化；最大，在一些决定性的问题，将会开启一个新的进程，产生足够的信任、互相谅解来产生极积的合作。
现在，如此积极的合作组织前景还不确定。但是除了他们的分歧，这两个国家有着共同的利益，并且他们的全球经济地位正在聚合，并不是背离。发展出这里描绘出的这一类伙伴关系，是很不容易的，要付出相当多的时间以及努力。但是，在台面上的问题是如此重要，甚至只要部分成功，就值得努力。去衡量一个主意的可行性，唯一的办法是去尝试。紧接下来的对话，建立一个全球战略来应对全球变暖，提供了一个引人注目的机会，来做为一个试验。 翻译的很好，因为只看懂中文。 far8008 发表于 2016-10-5 15:40
翻译的很好，因为只看懂中文。
我的水平非常非常有限，对于国际关系不太明白，翻译出来只能勉强看。能得到兄台夸奖，谢谢。大家交流 far8008 发表于 2016-10-5 15:40 static/image/common/back.gif
翻译的很好，因为只看懂中文。
同回复，呵呵 coconut 发表于 2016-10-5 16:28 static/image/common/back.gif
我的水平非常非常有限，对于国际关系不太明白，翻译出来只能勉强看。能得到兄台夸奖，谢谢。大家交流
谢谢分享 {:4_274:} far8008 发表于 2016-10-5 15:40 static/image/common/back.gif
翻译的很好，因为只看懂中文。
中文看得懂，说明的翻译可以了
还是对这篇文章的具体内容讨论哈 ，不辜负茶友花时间翻译，分享 本帖最后由 tdyxssrs 于 2016-10-12 21:06 编辑
平等合伙人 走向亚洲联盟 抛弃国际货币基金组织 新的游戏规则 两巨头
2012年5月3日在中美战略与经济对话框架下的战略对话中，戴秉国提出，中美不搞“两国集团”（G2），不搞中美主宰世界，也不搞中美冲突对抗，但可以搞“两国协调”（C2），加强沟通、协调与合作。
美国人为G2做的文宣--一种全球治理的架构，包括可能的G3、G5，而且G2是美国继续当老大的组织结构。
关于中国与别国合作及在世界经济方面取得的成就方面，美国人预设了价值判断--就是中国通过投机取巧取得的这些成绩，就是努力奋斗了也是不道德的不光彩的。在道义上给予压力进而作用到情感上诱导思维，这个有两个结果：1内疚，会顺着作者的思路走，跟着药方走；2反感，反感了就会有与内疚不同的行为方式，而是走自己的独立判断，这个需要多方面综合的知识，很多读者都做不到，虽然疑惑也很难反驳，临了还得跟着思路走。 最后的目标指向就是G2，其他的方面在此框架下谈。
和公司做事一个道理，一堆人做事，有人做成了别人怎么评价做成事的人及如何做事及相关责任。投机取巧了、不遵守规则了等此类词汇 ，关键是什么人在评价、评价的目的 。竞争者评价多半有酸葡萄心理和焦虑，还有搅事的意思在里面。关于责任的问题，要考虑责、权、利对等的，不能别人说谁的责任就是谁的！俗语不是说：这不是扣屎盆子吗！
16年国庆节IMF（国际货币基金组织）提升了中国的特别提款权的份额，这个08年金融危机以后就提出来了，都过了8年了，才有结果。就贡献和经济比重来说，应不应该呢，早就应该了，可为什么不执行呢？还不是关乎各国自身的利益份额的问题在扯皮。现在又遇到问题了--问题一直就没解决更严重了，要中国出力了。没彩头能干吗？！没看特蕾莎。梅不都在批评世界公民了吗！{:4_238:}
不是说文章中说的全球变暖、贸易、投资、汇率这些问题不存在，而是用什么方式解决、谁负什么责任、拥有什么权利。
16年7 月12日，南海仲裁案公布前，中美在南海对着军演。在此前几天，戴秉国前国务委员到访美国进行了二线外交，没谈妥。估计核心是全球治理结构的框架问题，G2还是C2。看来中国还是坚持C2了。
雄关漫道真如铁，而今迈步从头越。不能抱一丝一毫的侥幸
习近平强调，全球治理格局取决于国际力量对比，全球治理体系变革源于国际力量对比变化。我们要积极参与全球治理，主动承担国际责任，但也要尽力而为、量力而行。
习近平指出，随着时代发展现行全球治理体系不适应的地方越来越多，国际社会对变革全球治理体系的呼声越来越高。推动全球治理体系变革是国际社会大家的事，要坚持共商共建共享原则（注：天下没有免费的午餐），使关于全球治理体系变革的主张转化为各方共识，形成一致行动。要坚持为发展中国家发声，加强同发展中国家团结合作。 本帖最后由 tdyxssrs 于 2016-10-11 23:16 编辑
tdyxssrs 发表于 2016-10-11 00:50 static/image/common/back.gif
平等合伙人 走向亚洲联盟 抛弃国际货币基金组织 新的游戏规则 两巨头
戴秉国提出，中美不 ...
涉及到政策、标准、规则的制定，背后都会隐含着利益格局的变化，有受益的就有受损的。讨论利益分配就是利益分配，可在绝大多数的时候都会挂上道德的名头。其实最不靠谱的就是这个，你的绝对自由很可能是侵犯了别人的自由
其实，判断很简单，用一样的标致去衡量，先做事实判断，而不仅是价值判断，价值判断涉及到利益的归属、价值的认同及立场等，虽然最后谁都跑不了这个。
比如在冲突方面：东南亚金融危机、08年的次贷危机、冷战后国际上发生的及一系列的战争等，要做事实判断，事情到底带来了什么后果、对谁有利、对既有格局造成什么影响、对相关方造成了什么现实和潜在的影响，而不仅仅是某方宣传的自己初衷的高尚与伟大。这个最有发言权的是当事方：如阿富汗、叙利亚、伊拉克的各个阶层如何看待美国以反恐名义发动的战争，只是当事方的声音绝大多数人听不到，被忽略了；用换位思考或者将心比心去思考下，炸弹无缘无故就落自己头上，会是什么个情况？{:4_280:}
当然还有合作的方面，如各种国际合作机制，近期最引人注目的是TPP/TTIP想取代世贸组织，给中国人的感觉就是别人不带你玩了。{:4_238:}
其实从历史的全球角度看，不过是老大为了扩大、维护、巩固自己的地盘和利益的一系列战略、战役手段，其他的都是具体实施的工具。春秋无义战，就是对春秋战争史的评价。在这个角度下，美国在中国、俄罗斯周边的一系列军事行动就不难理解了，而且还会持续，没个结果以前不会停，当然中国、俄罗斯也没停。《动物世界》其实进行了最好的诠释。
历史以前如此、未来也会如此。因为资源有限、欲望无限。谁当老大都会站在自认为的道义至高点，这么去评判别人的，不仅仅是美国。 可惜发的有点晚，也没有军事方面的论述，不过肯定是好文章，赞一个！
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